The actor has leveraged compromised small office/home office (SOHO) network devices as intermediate infrastructure to obscure their activity by having much of the command and control (C2) traffic emanate from local ISPs in the geographic area of the victim. Additionally, if creating detection logic based on these commands, network defenders should account for variability in command string arguments, as items such as ports used may differ across environments. Defenders must evaluate matches to determine their significance, applying their knowledge of the system and baseline behavior. ![]() An Indicators of compromise (IOCs) summary is included at the end of this advisory.Įspecially for living off the land techniques, it is possible that some command lines might appear on a system as the result of benign activity and would be false positive indicators of malicious activity. It provides many network and host artifacts associated with the activity occurring after the network has been initially compromised, with a focus on command lines used by the cyber actor. This advisory will help net defenders hunt for this activity on their systems. The authoring agencies are aware of recent People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber activity and have identified potential indicators associated with these techniques. See the Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques for all referenced tactics and techniques. This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 13. People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection (XML, 34.57 KBįor a downloadable copy of IOCs in JSON format, see Technical Details ![]() Care should be taken not to assume that findings are malicious without further investigation or other indications of compromise.ĭownload the PDF version of this report (723 KB) Many of the behavioral indicators included can also be legitimate system administration commands that appear in benign activity. The advisory provides examples of the actor’s commands along with detection signatures to aid network defenders in hunting for this activity. Some of the built-in tools this actor uses are: wmic, ntdsutil, netsh, and PowerShell. This TTP allows the actor to evade detection by blending in with normal Windows system and network activities, avoid endpoint detection and response (EDR) products that would alert on the introduction of third-party applications to the host, and limit the amount of activity that is captured in default logging configurations. One of the actor’s primary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is living off the land, which uses built-in network administration tools to perform their objectives. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Communications Security Establishment’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and the United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring agencies”) provides an overview of hunting guidance and associated best practices to detect this activity. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. This advisory from the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and the authoring agencies believe the actor could apply the same techniques against these and other sectors worldwide. Private sector partners have identified that this activity affects networks across U.S. ![]() The United States and international cybersecurity authorities are issuing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight a recently discovered cluster of activity of interest associated with a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actor, also known as Volt Typhoon.
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